Zhukov emerges as a military leader who outworked his peers, was ruthless toward his subordinates, and devastated his troops. They provide exhaustive examinations not only of German and Soviet preparations for the battle, but also of the singular determination of Soviet Marshal G. Glantz and House offer an accumulation of details missing from earlier accounts. German sources were incomplete because the Soviets had carted off a large number of German documents after the war and, unsurprisingly, the memoirs of generals on both sides tended to be self-serving. What was known about the battle came from German documents and memoirs of generals on both sides. Scholars that key World War II Red Army documents must exist, but Moscow denied requests to open archives, and no one knew with any certainty exactly what information they contained. The book is based, in part, on recently-available Soviet sources. This brings us to the value of this book. As it turned out, the Russians were not intimidated, and Italy dropped out the war days after Hitler ordered the withdrawal of Nazi forces from the Kursk salient. The second is that Berlin ultimately believed that the Germans needed to inflict a massive beating upon the Red Army in order to permanently intimidate them as well as to persuade wavering allies to remain in the war. The first is that although there was no clear-cut Soviet victory, the ultimate result was that the Red Army's gained military dominance in Eastern Europe. House buttress two earlier understandings. In this latest account of what was arguably World War II's most critical European engagement David M. Reviewed by Milton Goldin (National Coalition of Independent Scholars (NCIS)) Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
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